In many ways, the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showcased the strengths and weaknesses of American disaster response public policy. Ultimately resulting in the loss of over 1,800 lives and the destruction of thousands of acres, much analysis has been devoted to retroactively examining the role of administrative discretion and communication in the U.S. government’s response to Hurricane Katrina (Moynihan). Although the administrative discretion invoked by the DOD and specific actors like Lt. General Honoré paved the way for an influx of aid to a flooded New Orleans, poor implementation of the ICS model, lackluster communication, and the organizational culture of the DOD delayed the administration of resources at a crucial time.
Poor implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) proved to be the first obstacle government agencies encountered in attempting to swiftly provide disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Katrina. Initially designed in the 1970s to standardize responses to wildfires in California, the ICS was eventually picked up as a national, and later international, model for disaster relief response (Moynihan). Although the ICS model prioritizes a “unified command structure,” “consolidated action plans,” and “integrated communications,” among other core concepts, each of these elements appeared to be in short supply (“Emergency Management”). First and foremost, the existence of a Principal Federal Official (PFO) and Joint Task Force Katrina created confusion around hierarchy, even though ICS protocol placed the Joint Field Office and its Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in charge. This point of contention only worsened when it became clear that some leading officials within these operational commands lacked clear roles and the motivation to fulfill them, as evidenced by PFO Michael Brown’s lack of training and ineffectual communication (Moynihan).
These muddled leadership roles and murky hierarchical structures inevitably led to a lack of integrated communications, further violating crucial ICS objectives. Even when operational commands did attempt to communicate with one another, preexisting communication chains and protocols often tied officers up with red tape. For instance, although FEMA had a better ground-level assessment of which resources were desperately needed, their requests for helicopters, boats, and other necessities rarely made it all the way to the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) for approval. Despite extenuating circumstances, numerous aid requests made within the first 24 hours following Katrina’s passage through New Orleans were returned for lacking an unattainable level of detail (Moynihan). Although the aid request protocol was established to keep track of military supplies and mission costs, the rigidity enforced by public administrators at the time led to frustration and wasted valuable time. The inefficacy of the JDOMS aid approval system was eventually overcome when the DOD decided to utilize vast amounts of administrative discretion and operate by verbal command, making formal paperwork a secondary concern. Tedious paperwork was not, however, the only communication failure of this natural disaster. Several months after Hurricane Katrina wreaked havoc on the city of New Orleans, research came to light indicating that not only were state officials informed of the likelihood of such a disastrous storm years in advance, but many such leaders actually disregarded warnings about the levees breaking (“The Man Who”). In fact, many walked away from disaster preparedness exercises with the understanding that FEMA would supply necessary aid in the first 48 hours, which, as discussed, proved to be more difficult than expected due to the strict paperwork process enforced early on.
Finally, representing an amalgamation of unclear leadership and lackluster communication, the organizational culture of the DoD ultimately delayed the distribution of aid and supplies immediately following Hurricane Katrina’s passage through New Orleans. Although the DoD eventually slackened their tight grip on military resources, two components could have contributed to their initial unwillingness to look past standard protocol: residual apprehension towards interfering in civilian affairs stemming from the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and a general dislike of “mission creep.” Though it was passed over 100 years before Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, the lingering impact of the Posse Comitatus Act could have had an impact on the organizational culture of the modern DoD. Drawing distinct lines between civilian and military affairs, the Posse Comitatus Act was designed to ensure military resources were used in appropriate settings: a concern mimicked in the JDOMS aid request protocol (Tkacz). Also contributing to the DoD’s apparent unwillingness to break painstakingly slow protocol in the early aftermath was the general view that Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) were or should be outside their scope of responsibilities (Moynihan). This militaristic mindset likely factored into their later decisions, which were often acted upon without notifying relevant parties, like the Joint Field Office and FEMA. For instance, the DoD’s Joint Task Force, headed by Lt. General Honoré, refrained from filling in FEMA on altered Superdome evacuation plans prior to enacting them.
Although government officials, particularly the DoD, eventually managed to overcome their initially sluggish response, the management of Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath was largely regarded as a public administration gaff. Despite the intended implementation of ICS emergency response protocols, the existence of multiple operational commands (the JFO, PFO, and Joint Task Force Katrina) made individual responsibilities and the chain of command unclear. This confusion underscored the need for future clarification of the hierarchy and a more concentrated effort to enhance communication both between and within agencies. Considering the ICS model’s widespread use for natural disasters, perhaps the simplest solution would be to follow its protocol more closely and allow the Joint Field Office to spearhead aid efforts as initially intended.
Streamlining and clarifying the hierarchy would also have a positive impact on communication in disaster scenarios. Cities could undertake precautions to maintain open lines of communications in the event of recurring power outages, like ensuring all essential personnel are equipped with satellite phones. Furthermore, all parties involved could benefit from a streamlined aid request process. Cutting through the red tape by reducing the level of detail public administrators and first responders are expected to provide in a disaster scenario could ultimately save lives. This may also help officials overcome the issue of autonomous actors (like the DoD) refusing to coordinate their efforts. By addressing these preventable communication barriers, failures of communication can be attributed to specific groups rather than citing general leadership confusion. When communication channels are wide open, individual organizations and actors, like the DoD and Lt. General Honoré, will be left with few excuses not to coordinate. Thus, to prevent future public administration shortfalls in times of crisis, government officials should prioritize streamlined communications by establishing a clear hierarchy and defined organizational roles.
Works Cited
“Emergency Management and the Incident Command System.” U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/mscc
/handbook/chapter1/Pages/emergencymanagement.aspx. Accessed 26 Aug. 2021.
Moynihan, Donald P. "Collaboration amid crisis: The department of defense during
hurricane Katrina." (2015).
Tkacz, Scott R. "In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in Domestic
Emergencies." William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal. vol. 15, no. 1, 2006,
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol15/iss1/11. Accessed 26 Aug. 2021.
“The Man Who Predicted Katrina.” PBS, 21 Nov. 2005,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/predicting-katrina/. Accessed 26 Aug. 2021.