Executive Summary
Despite being one of the oldest countries in the world, Greece’s diplomatic, economic, and social futures remain unclear. Diplomatically, the outcome of Greece’s ongoing conflict with Turkey remains to be seen. Though the countries have a storied history of territorial disputes in the Mediterranean, tensions have become heated over the recent discovery of natural gas fields in the region (Barkey). Conflicting exclusive economic zones and the ongoing Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus further underscore their sovereignty-based conflicts. Greece’s relationship with Russia has also become strained in recent years (Bechev). Averse to external political meddling but in want of backing in the Mediterranean, the outcome of this relationship will likely be dependent upon the EU and NATO’s involvement in deescalating the situation between Greece and Turkey. Greece continues to be under intense economic pressure. While EU bailouts have yielded some success, austerity measures have ultimately yielded public unrest and the decimation of the private sector, leaving economic growth stagnant (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos). Socially, Greece faces another issue entirely. The influx of immigrants and refugees to Greece’s outlying islands has placed additional strain on its weakened economy, caused societal unrest with anti-immigration rhetoric, and exposed refugees to overcrowded and unsanitary conditions (Stivas; Papadimos et al.). As Greece’s partner in NATO the U.S. has previously aided the country’s operations monetarily (through the Marshall Plan) and diplomatically (in the de-escalation Greece-Turkey tensions in 1996), but as the U.S. appears to pull back from the region, our interests in Greece’s operations remain undecided (Lindsay and McMahon).
Foreign Policy Update: Greece
Greece and Turkey: EEZ Disputes Persist in the Mediterranean
Current disputes between the two nations are informed by prior history but revolve around the following:
1) Ongoing Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus
2) Territorial disputes over islands and regions of the Aegean Sea
3) Incompatible exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
Conflicts between Greece and Turkey have escalated in recent years, but historically tensions between the two span centuries (Dalay). Sovereignty remains the primary bone of contention between Greece and Turkey. Previously controlled by Istanbul for centuries, neither Greece nor Cyprus was enthused about the Turkish occupation of Cyprus in 1974 (Lindsay and McMahon, 2020). The creation of a Turkish-controlled Northern Republic of Cyprus has since blurred the lines of sovereignty in the region and encouraged Turkey to reclaim other territories nearby, particularly Greek-owned islands off the Turkish coast (Lindsay and McMahon, 2021).
The discovery of natural gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea appears to have exacerbated these territorial disputes and precipitated the creation of overlapping EEZs (Barkey). In the region, the extraction of such resources is monitored and managed by the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) whose founders include Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Jordan, Palestine, and Italy. Excluded from the EMFG, and the UN which oversees its operations, Turkey (in a deal with Libya) decided to expand its EEZ to include portions of the natural gas fields. In doing so, Turkey’s self-determined EEZ now overlaps with that of Egypt and Greece. It also infringes upon Cyprus’s EEZ, though Turkey disputes this by claiming that Turkish Cypriots should also be entitled to “energy exploration activities” (Dalay). Turkey’s construction of several drilling ships along with a more expansive navy has allowed them to pursue energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, but not without opposition (Barkey).
Although Germany attempted to mediate the conflict following the declaration of Turkey’s newly expanded EEZ, these efforts petered out as Egypt and Greece collaborated to reassert their own EEZ (Lindsay and McMahon, 2020). Ignoring this reassertion of sovereignty, Turkish research ships entered the disputed waters in search of hydrocarbon resources (Lindsay and McMahon, 2021). Tensions then came to a head as a Turkish naval vessel collided with a Greek ship, both of which were trailing Turkey’s seismic ship. Following this development, fellow EU members France and Italy contributed naval vessels to the region in solidarity with Greece (Lindsay and McMahon, 2020). Rather than calm tensions, France’s presence only complicated matters as they previously led the opposition movement against Turkey’s near admission to the EU and currently oppose them in the Libyan Civil War.
Since the addition of more military might to the region, UN powers have sought to bring the crisis come to a more peaceful conclusion. Sixty rounds of talks were held until their suspension in 2016 and yielded few results other than the minor economic sanctions placed on Turkey (Lindsay and McMahon, 2021). Despite Turkey’s resolve to regain sovereignty in the regions around its border, these economic sanctions have been relatively successful in diminishing aggressive actions. The U.S.’s position in mediating the conflict, however, remains unclear. Although the U.S. successfully brought Greece and Turkey back from the brink of war in 1996, the U.S. has since withdrawn our presence in the region. Because both Greece and Turkey maintain membership in NATO, the United States is arguably well-positioned to foster better bilateral relations between the two countries, but any intentions to do so have yet to be expressed.
Relationship with Russia
Greece’s shifting relationship with Russia constitutes another ongoing development for the U.S. to keep track of. From the early 2000s until 2018, the two nations appeared to be strengthening ties, starting economically (Grashkin). Although these plans have since fallen through, the Russian, Bulgarian, and Greek governments reached an agreement in 2007 to establish a Balkan oil pipeline to Europe. Since this setback, the Russian natural gas supply company Gazprom has continued to promote the construction of Turkstream 2 which exports gas to Turkey and passes through Greece to supply southeastern Europe as well.
Russian influence in Greece has not, however, remained isolated to the economy. Putin’s use of soft power appeared to make significant headway in 2015 with the election of Alexis Tsipras as Prime Minister. Not only did Tsipras publicly reject the EU’s admonishment of Russia’s activity in Ukraine, but Putin and Tsipras also exchanged visits during which they bonded over their countries’ Orthodox histories. More formally, this resulted in Moscow’s promotion of Greece’s Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO). Russia’s attempt to capitalize on this shared history may be viewed as part of a broader agenda to reassert soft power and bring eastern nations back into the fold, away from the influence of NATO and the EU.
In 2018 ties between Greece and Russia became increasingly strained as Russia sought to thwart the Prespa Agreement between Greece and Macedonia which could lead to Macedonia’s admission to NATO (Bechev). Specifically, Russia’s instigation of Greek nationalists opposing the agreement led to Athens’ expulsion of two Russian diplomats. Though these actions suggest the devolution of ties between Greece and Russia, especially given Greece’s unwillingness to relinquish the regional mediating service memberships in NATO and the EU provide, the U.S. should remain watchful of future changes in their dynamic. As tensions between Greece and Turkey flare up with little effective assistance from NATO or the EU, Russian aid may become more appealing.
Economic Crisis
The Greek Economy has been in dire straits since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 (“Greece’s Debt”). Their economic decline, however, was already in motion long before Greece joined the EU and adopted the Euro under false pretenses. Because a shared currency endows Eurozone members with a vested interest in one another’s economic prosperity, Greece had much to gain by concealing their inability to meet the EU’s Maastricht guidelines. Thus, despite rising inflation and a debt level exceeding 100% of their GDP, Greece joined the Eurozone community in 2001 with cover-up help from Goldman-Sachs.
Their situation only worsened in 2004 with the accrual of massive debt to host the summer Olympic Games and again in 2007 with the Global Banking Crisis (“Greece’s Debt”). By 2009 Greece’s budget deficit was estimated to be around 15.4%, well outside the 3% limit mandated by Maastricht guidelines. Threatening the economic stability of the Eurozone, the EU arranged its first bailout of the Greek economy with assurances from Greek Prime Minister Papandreou that austerity measures would be implemented. Entailing unpopular consequences like public sector job losses and increased taxes, austerity measures have been a source of contention between the Greek people and their government ever since.
A second EU bailout was arranged in 2012 that supplied Greece with an additional $172 billion in exchange for promises to reduce the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio to 120.5% by 2020, a target they did not reach (“Greece’s Debt”). 2013 saw increased public irritation over additional austerity measures that fostered further economic stagnation. Despite these measures, Greece became “the first developed country to effectively default to the [International Monetary] Fund” in 2015 when it was unable to make a $1.7 billion payment. Unwilling to put the rest of the Eurozone at risk, this prompted a third EU bailout package, bringing Greece’s bailout debt to the EU and IMF to a grand total of $330 billion.
While evidence (like a lowering unemployment rate) exists to suggest that Greece’s economy may be able to return to pre-crisis levels by 2031, some insist that the structures behind Greece’s initial economic failure have not been remedied (Thomsen). A combination of kleptocracy, clientelism, and austerity measures made politically radical groups more appealing, often leading the public to fixate on the idea of “Grexit” as a panacea. Attachment to this idea, however, only worsened the situation by crippling private business investment (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos); see Table One (Thomsen). Today, the Greek economy remains on the mend, but long-term stability will require changes in the kleptocratic power structure and the revitalization of the private sector.
Table One
Immigration and the Refugee Crisis
Like many European countries, Greece has been faced with an overwhelming influx of refugees in recent years. In fact, more than its neighbors, Greece and its outlying islands serve as one of the main gateways to wealthier European nations for refugees from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Central Asia (Schumacher). Considering Greece’s already dire economic straits, increased pressure from overcrowded refugee camps has led to political strife.
Under New Democracy, the central-right party that led Greece’s government from 2012 to 2015, anti-immigration rhetoric was rampant. The refugee crisis was framed as a major threat to “Greece’s economy, culture, and existence,” and officials were given leeway to solve the crisis however they saw fit (Stivas, 2021). Asylum became harder and harder to seek, and deportations, legal and otherwise, increased dramatically. While some immigrants and refugees were driven back to their countries of origin, others were placed on inflatable rafts to drift back into Turkish waters (Schumacher).
Under the radical-left Syriza party, the country took a new, more humanitarian, approach to the crisis from 2015 to 2018 (Stivas, 2021). Under Prime Minister Tsipras officials sought to change the narrative around refugees to prioritize their rights and conditions, rather than present them as security threats. To achieve this goal, the Syriza government employed the help of the EU which provided financial aid and human resources. The EU also implemented the Relocation Scheme to offset some of the strain placed on Greece to other members of the EU.
Despite these successes, New Democracy regained control of the government during Greece’s 2019 snap elections, making the future of the refugee crisis within its borders unclear. The fact remains that Greece’s camps are largely overcrowded despite the EU’s relocation efforts (Papadimos et al., 2021). Infectious diseases like respiratory infections, Hepatitis, Leishmania, and Shigella, run rampant while the mental health of camp residents continues to decline. COVID-19 has only worsened matters, as camps continue to hold thousands more residents than they were built for thereby making social distancing measures virtually impossible to implement (Schumacher). With the reinstatement of New Democracy leaders, Greece has seen a return to aggressive deportation tactics. Though these measures may achieve the goal of satisfying the general population in the short-term, refugees continue to pour into Greece’s outlying islands, thereby highlighting the need for long-lasting solutions. Based on the global nature of the refugee crisis, it is likely that Greece will need to call upon its allies to see sustained change.
References
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