Assignment Reflection
The essay below is a completed case study for a public administration course at Auburn University. Within the assignment, the causes and outcomes of the Flint Water Crisis are analyzed, and the role of public administration therein is put in context. When public crises arise, whether they are matters of public health like the Flint Water Crisis, or a national disaster, like Hurricane Katrina, public administrators play a crucial role in maintaining public wellbeing. While their objectives may be clear, administrative discretion allows for wiggle room in policy execution for better or for worse.
Public health responsibilities were clearly shirked during the Flint Water Crisis, wherein public administrators actively sought to cover-up misdeeds and inaction, despite causing detriment to public health. Overall, the Flint Water Crisis serves as a stark reminder of the role of values and accountability in public administration. In this scenario, personal wellbeing (in the form of job maintenance) was prioritized over public health, and accountability seemed scarce in the aftermath. Though some public administrators involved are now being held accountable by the court system, plausible deniability appears to be protecting officials at the top.
Accountability and the Flint Water Crisis
Stemming from deceit and cover-ups and resulting in the dependence of an entire city on bottled water, the Flint Water Crisis was a government failure through and through. Though some say the city’s crisis began when its main water source was switched to the Flint River, deep-seated economic issues initiated the downward spiral decades before (Smith et al.). Like many cities in Michigan, Flint suffered economically when the automotive industry took a downturn. Seemingly unable to counteract the economic effects of the mass emigration from Flint, the State of Michigan opted to place emergency managers in control: a decision which precipitated the cost-driven conclusion to change the city’s water source (Smith et al.).
Shortly after the switch, Flint’s residents began complaining to government officials that their tap water was no longer clear and tasted metallic (Smith et al.). Despite these claims, investigations into the city’s water quality yielded little explanation, but not for lack of evidence. In fact, citizens were permitted to drink lead-contaminated water for multiple months as employees of the State Department of Environmental Quality actively doctored sample results to create the appearance of cleaner water (Davey and Pérez-Peña). Furthermore, even as employees in the state’s Department of Health and Human Resources became aware of rising blood lead levels among the city’s children, officials sought to coverup the evidence rather than pursue action (Haimerl and Goodnough). The lead contamination itself can also be chalked up to governmental error as the Department of Environmental Quality never treated the city’s pipes with anti-corrosion solutions or sought to replace them (Davey and Pérez-Peña).
Now, seven years later, citizens still suffer from the aftermath of the crisis but have received some vindication through the prosecution of government officials. Several low-level representatives from the departments have since been charged with misdemeanors like tampering with evidence or willful neglect of duty, though some have been charged with felonies like misconduct in office (Davey and Pérez-Peña). The crisis also yielded positive change as new elected officials stepped in to replace those in office during the crisis. Mayor Weaver, elected to office in 2015, sought to quickly replace the city’s pipes and, as of April 2019, had overseen the replacement of over 8,000 service lines (Smith et al.). Despite these positive changes, overall trust in government remains low in the area, and for good reason. As researchers investigate the implications and developmental effects of increased blood lead levels in the city’s children, some have also linked the untreated water to an outbreak of Legionnaire’s Disease which caused multiple deaths in the Flint community (Haimerl and Goodnough).
Yielding such dangerous outcomes, the public administrators’ actions can be considered in breach of professional, organizational, and social ethics (Shafritz et al. 200). While personal ethics were likely violated, the highly variable nature of such ethics from person to person makes a widespread claim of violation difficult to justify. Perhaps most obviously, the public administrators responsible for the Flint Water Crisis failed to adhere to professional ethics. As public administrators, all parties involved were expected to adhere to the American Society of Public Administration’s ethical standards. Among these, the need to “advance the public interest” and “strengthen social equity” were clearly abandoned as officials prioritized their jobs over public welfare and the effects of the crisis were felt disproportionately along race and poverty lines (Sadler and Highsmith). Similarly, organizational ethics were also deserted as officials from the Department of Environmental Quality and the Department of Health and Human Services failed to fulfill their organizational roles properly. Despite organizational requirements to collect and report accurate data, the government employees involved sought to skew data and avoid responsibility (Haimerl and Goodnough). Finally, in choosing to value their jobs over the public health of city residents, the perpetrating officials were assuredly guilty of violating social ethics. These ethical tradeoffs ,presumably based on a higher value for self-preservation than public good, ultimately affected thousands of residents.
Given the scale of ethical violations that precipitated the Flint Water Crisis, the question follows: how can we enforce ethical standards to prevent future transgressions? According to political scientist Carl J. Friederich, internal controls like “professional standards or codes” are needed to overcome the “complexities of modern policies” (Shafritz et al. 210). Conversely, political scientist Herman Finer stated that external (“legislative or popular”) controls are needed to prevent internal corruption (Shafritz et al. 210). Given the complex hierarchy of public administration, arguably both tactics are needed. While the ASPA maintains ethical standards for administrators, the Department of Environmental Quality and Department of Health and Human Resources might have benefitted from a similar set of clear expectations. Perhaps, more importantly, violations of said expectations should be accompanied by clear punitive measures dependent on the severity of the infraction. As Finer suggests, the suggestion of punitive measures may incentivize coverups like those witnessed during the Flint Water Crisis, so external controls are equally important (Shafritz et al. 210). Distinct oversight committees could be established for such efforts, which would not only decrease the likelihood of a successful coverup but would also reduce ambiguity around the responsibilities of high-level officials. By keeping these officials periodically updated on organizational proceedings, oversight committees could ensure that upper-level bureaucrats are kept responsible for the actions of their staff.
The need for both external and internal controls is best exemplified by the Flint Water Crisis Incident Report, which referred to the crisis as prime example of “government failure, intransigence, unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environmental injustice” (Lin et al.). As evidenced by the targeted conviction of low-level bureaucrats, the primary burden of the fallout has (for the most part) left upper-level officials untouched. While district engineers, district supervisors, and utility managers faced misdemeanor charges, officials like Governor Rick Snyder were allowed to retire in peace or simply continue their work contingent upon their reelection (Lin et al.). The apparent discrepancy between the prosecution rates of low-level bureaucrats and their bosses is likely the direct result of accountability. Although their bosses are, by extension, responsible for their actions on some level, without proof of direct instruction to violate organizational norms, the blame predominantly falls on those who committed the violations (i.e., the low-level bureaucrats who decided to doctor data and misreport findings). This dearth of accountability from upper-level bureaucrats has, understandably, disappointed the Flint community who sees them as equally culpable (Haimerl and Goodnough). While low-level bureaucrats may have taken the initiative to violate ethical standards, their behavior reflected the state government in its entirety.
Health issues and prolonged paranoia aren’t the only ongoing issues the Flint community faces in the wake of the crisis. Despite ongoing efforts to replace the pipes and remedy the issues at hand, public trust in the government has been largely undermined (Smith et al.). Seven years after the crisis, Flint’s public officials are still grappling with these consequences. Perhaps the most effective way to regain public confidence is to implement and publicly advertise internal and external organizational controls. In doing so, accountability practices would become more transparent for bureaucrats and citizens alike, while leveling the playing field of accountability regardless of rank.
Works Cited
Haimerl, Amy and Abby Goodnough. “6 More Workers Charged in Flint Water Crisis.” The
New York Times, 29 July 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/us/flint-michigan-water-crisis.html. Accessed 24 Sept. 2021.
Lin, Jeremy C. F., Rutter, Jean, and Haeyoun Park. “Events That Led to Flint’s Water Crisis.”
The New York Times, 21 Jan. 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/21/us/flint-lead-water-timeline.html. Accessed 24 Sept. 2021.
Davey, Monica, and Richard Pérez-Peña. “Flint Water Crisis Yields First Criminal Charges.”
The New York Times, 20 April 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/us/first-criminal-charges-are-filed-in-flint-water-crisis.html. Accessed 24 Sept. 2021.
Sadler, Casey, and Andrew R. Highsmith. “Rethinking Tiebout: The Contribution of Political
Fragmentation and Racial/Economic Segregation to the Flint Water Crisis.” Environmental Justice, vol. 9, no. 5, 2016. pp. 143-152.
Shafritz, Jay M., Russell, E. W., Borick, Christopher P., and Albert C. Hyde. Introducing
Public Administration. 11th ed., Routledge, 2017.
Smith, Mitch, Bosman, Julie, and Monica Davey. “Flint’s Water Crisis Starter Over 5 Years
Ago. It’s Not Over.” The New York Times, 25 April 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/flint-water-crisis.html. Accessed 24 Sept. 2021.